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INTO THE ABYSS?
European Naval Power in the Post–Cold War Era
Jeremy Stöhs

S

ince the end of the Cold War, European sea power—particularly its naval
element—has undergone drastic change.1 The dissolution of the Soviet Union
not only heralded a period of Western unilateralism but also put an end to previous levels of military investment. In fact, once the perceived threat that Soviet
forces posed had disappeared, many Western governments believed that the era
of great-power rivalry and major-power wars finally had come to an end.2 Rather
than necessitating preparation for war, the security environment now ostensibly
allowed states to allocate their funds to other areas, such as housing, education,
and health care. As a result, for more than two decades, the majority of naval
forces across Europe have been subject to declining budgets and far-reaching
downscaling measures.
Although the post–Cold War era proved to be anything but peaceful, all
military engagements throughout the 1990s involving Western states took place
either at the lower end of the intensity spectrum or against enemies that posed
a relatively limited threat to the overwhelming superiority of the NATO allies. Combined-arms warfare, effects-based operations, and coercive air strikes
against a series of state and nonstate actors underscored the West’s ability to apply
military force with near impunity.
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, however, effectively put an end
to this period of largely unchecked Western military interventions. The attacks
not only marked the beginning of an ongoing struggle between the United States
and its allies and radical Islamic terrorism; they also drew attention away from
traditional concepts of the utility of naval forces, such as providing credible deterrence, buttressing collective defense, and maintaining sea control. Over the following decade, counterinsurgency and counterterrorism, as well as constabulary
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operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, and the greater Middle East, took center stage.
Concomitantly, the land and air forces involved in these theaters received the
lion’s share of funding, while naval power (again) was considered a mere supporting element of twenty-first-century warfare. In Europe, these developments
heightened the already-existing lack of appreciation for the significance of the
maritime environment and the value of naval forces for a state’s security and
prosperity—a political and cultural myopia often referred to as “sea blindness.”3
As defense spending continued to decline, so did the size of most Western
fleets.4 By the end of the first decade of the new century, Europe’s naval forces
were heading into the proverbial abyss. Smaller than at any time in recent history,
naval forces across Europe had lost important proficiencies and capabilities. The
shortfall in naval platforms had substantial bearing on the ability to deal effectively with the growing range of naval tasks. The modernization of many navies
has been hampered not only by shrinking budgets but by cost overruns, lengthy
procurement processes, and major technical deficiencies. These problems were
compounded by the fact that many armed forces across the continent have found
it increasingly difficult to recruit and retain young men and women, while the
overhead costs for personnel consume large parts of defense budgets.5 Consequently, significant shortfalls in training and readiness—and hence the ability to
use naval forces to pursue and achieve political ends—have arisen.
This article will outline the development of Europe’s naval forces since the end
of the Cold War. It will address the challenges European naval forces have faced
in an evolving security environment, and will argue that more than two decades
of fiscal austerity measures have jeopardized Europe’s ability both to ensure good
order at sea and to provide credible deterrence, and have limited its ability to
promote common interests and shape events abroad.
This proposition is supported by Europe’s most recent efforts to strengthen
its defense capabilities. Russia’s military actions along Europe’s flanks and mass
migrations to Europe and the associated threat of terrorism, as well as the uncertainty pertaining to America’s foreign policy objectives, have elicited responses
from European states to shoulder greater responsibility for their own security.
The extent to which these developments can lead to a lasting revitalization of
European naval power will be discussed in the final section.
AFTER THE FALL OF THE WALL (1989–2001)
To many observers in the West, the quick and relatively peaceful demise of the
Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact came as a great surprise.6 Consequently, until
the end, the naval forces of the European NATO partners were considered the
fulcrum on which rested the West’s ability to deter—and, in the case of war, to
defeat—Soviet forces.
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol71/iss3/4
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From Sea Control to Out-of-Area Operations
With the confrontation between the two superpowers relegated to the pages of
history, most of Europe’s leaders were quick to interpret these events as nothing
less than the end of great-power rivalry. No longer bound to the parochial contingency plans postulated by the United States and NATO, the majority of Europe’s
navies began shifting toward a peacetime posture.
The United Kingdom: Shifting of Priorities. For the British Royal Navy (RN), the
most distinguished and most powerful among Europe’s naval forces, the Cold
War by and large ended on a high note—followed almost immediately by a shifting of priorities. Apart from the U.S. Navy, only the Russian navy—slowly rusting
away in what used to be credible sea bastions—exceeded the fleet carrying the
white ensign in size and capabilities. The Falklands War a decade earlier had
provided the RN with painful yet invaluable insights, and substantial improvements had been made to existing platforms and operational procedures to address the apparent shortcomings.7 Furthermore, a number of large-scale navalprocurement projects were under way. These included replacement of the navy’s
ballistic-missile submarines (with four of the new Vanguard class), introduction
of the capable Type 23 antisubmarine warfare (ASW) frigates, and development
of a common air-defense destroyer among France, Italy, and the United Kingdom
(the Horizon project, later the Type 45 for the RN).
On the other hand, the RN also faced some serious challenges. First and
foremost, defense spending plummeted from nearly 4 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) in 1991 to 2.5 percent in 1998. In other words, the military
budget was cut by more than 20 percent in real terms.8 Second, the new strategic
environment no longer required a fleet of nearly fifty surface combatants and
twenty-two submarines (both nuclear and conventionally powered). “[Britain’s]
Cold War mission of hunting Soviet submarines had vanished, and along with it
the chief justification for large chunks of the Fleet.”9
Throughout the 1990s, the RN had to accept incremental reductions to its
force structure, as well as curtailment of acquisition programs. To save money,
the number of personnel was decreased from 69,000 to 50,000 within ten years.
Still, the RN fared somewhat better than its sister services. One reason was the
RN’s importance as a key enabler of Britain’s effort to “prevent or shape crises
further away [from home] and [its ability] to deploy military forces rapidly before
they get out of hand,” as the Strategic Defence Review published in 1998 emphasized.10 The procurement of two larger aircraft carriers to replace the three existing smaller ships underscored the continued relevance of the RN as an effective
tool of foreign policy.
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Like other European navies, the RN increasingly shifted its focus from openocean, sea-control operations along the sea lines of communication (SLOCs)
in the North Atlantic and homeland defense (in particular, ASW near the approaches to Britain’s ports) to power projection over great distances and into the
littoral regions of the world. Projecting military force from the sea onto land (e.g.,
carrier aviation and long-range cruise missiles) had proved expedient during
military operations in the Balkans and the Middle East.11
Britain’s close relationship with the United States allowed the RN to acquire
new systems and technologies, such as Tomahawk cruise missiles, providing
the navy with an important capability to fulfill these new roles. Yet while the
Anglo-American defense partnership flourished, Britain’s collaboration with its
European neighbors initially yielded rather mixed results.
France, Italy, and Spain: Consolidation of Forces. France and Britain share a rich
history of both competition and cooperation. Over the centuries, the two great
powers waged countless wars against each other, culminating in the battle of Trafalgar, the later defeat of Napoleon, and the provisions of the Congress of Vienna
in 1815. Strategic competition and deep-seated suspicions persisted between the
two countries. Neither fighting side by side in two world wars nor the looming
threat of a Soviet invasion could obscure the fact that, during large parts of the
twentieth century, Paris and London did not see eye to eye.
What is more, conflicting views on France’s status within NATO persuaded
President Charles de Gaulle to withdraw from the alliance in 1966.12 As a direct
consequence of that decision, the French military’s raison d’être to this day is
based on providing France with capabilities with which to respond to crises that
run the gamut of the intensity spectrum. Moreover, the state’s geographic location, as well as its numerous overseas territories (remnants of its former colonial
empire), has shaped the French fleet to a considerable degree.
By the time the Cold War drew to a close, the French and British had fashioned
navies of similar size. However, the respective fleets were based on somewhat
different strategic and operational concepts. Unlike the RN, which was designed
principally for sea control (ASW) and the deployment of carrier strike groups in
the North Atlantic, the Marine Nationale (MN), as the French navy officially is
called, operated a mix of some “first-rate” warships and a significant number of
“second-rate” surface combatants and patrol vessels. The latter are required to
conduct constabulary duties, such as fisheries protection in the French exclusive
economic zone (EEZ). In fact, France possesses the world’s second-largest EEZ
(more than 4.2 million square miles) and has naval forces continuously deployed
to the Atlantic, Indian, and Pacific Oceans.13 Furthermore, while the British
submarine-based nuclear deterrent had to rely heavily on U.S. technological
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assistance, all critical components of France’s force océanique stratégique (its seabased nuclear forces) were of domestic design.14
To this day, such diverging operational requirements represent a major
stumbling block to establishing common European security frameworks and
pursuing joint procurement projects. The aforementioned attempt to develop a
new air-defense destroyer trilaterally for the British, French, and Italian navies
failed largely over differences regarding the specific capabilities each stakeholder
deemed necessary.15 Fortunately, France and Italy continued to pursue the project, ultimately receiving two vessels each. Britain would go on to build six ships
of similar design, the Type 45 Daring-class destroyers.
Throughout the 1990s,
In Europe, these developments heightened the the MN held a decisive advantage over the RN (and all
already-existing lack of appreciation for the
significance of the maritime environment and other navies of the time, save
the U.S. Navy), despite its
the value of naval forces for a state’s security
and prosperity—a political and cultural myo- somewhat less capable surface
component. In contrast to the
pia often referred to as “sea blindness.”
British, Italians, and Spanish,
all of whom operated relatively small short-takeoff/vertical-landing (STOVL)
carriers, France had two flat-deck carriers fitted with steam catapults. This allowed the French navy to deploy a well-balanced naval air wing more effectively
and over greater distances. The naval air arms of the other navies had to content
themselves with Harrier jump jets and helicopters, all of which had inherent
limitations with regard to range / loiter time and capability.
Not being able to rely on NATO’s security guarantees, France remained somewhat more cautious in the early years of the post–Cold War era. Rather than
implementing rash defense cuts or canceling construction programs outright,
France put its navy’s organizational structure through a comprehensive streamlining effort.16 As part of the Optimar 95 program, large parts of naval command
structures were disbanded and the fleet was divided between the naval bases
in Toulon (carriers, expeditionary forces) and Brest (ASW, mine warfare, and
strategic submarines).17 In addition, major construction processes of warships
were stretched to alleviate strain on the shrinking budget. Most noticeably, only
a single carrier remained in service.
Meanwhile, both of France’s Mediterranean neighbors, Italy and Spain, found
themselves in relatively comfortable situations in the early 1990s.
With the Italian Peninsula occupying a critical geographic position along
Europe’s southern shores, Italy’s sphere of interest largely was confined to two
main lines stretching across the Mediterranean Sea: starting from Gibraltar, “one
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reaching the Black Sea and the Middle East through the Balkans and the Aegean
Sea; the [other] moving southward through the Red Sea down to the Indian
Ocean, the Gulf, and including the Horn of Africa.”18
While the Italian navy (the Marina Militare, or MM) had remained relatively
hamstrung throughout the first decades of the Cold War, owing to political and
doctrinal limitations, the Soviet naval buildup during the late 1970s and early
1980s required the MM to establish a greater presence along NATO’s southern
flank. Many new warships were built during this period, while existing platforms
underwent modernization and refit. By the end of the Cold War, Italy was operating a well-balanced fleet of ships and submarines, most of which had been built
domestically.
At the same time, the country’s military strategy transitioned from sea control
and static defense against Soviet forces to power projection into regions farther
from home.19 Italy’s military engagements in Iraq (1991), Yugoslavia (1993–97),
Mozambique (1993), Somalia (1991–95), and Eritrea (1998) and against Serbia
(1999) highlight the MM’s set of capabilities, as well as the country’s willingness
to take action within its designated sphere of influence. Although the percentage of military expenditure slightly decreased between 1990 and 2000, the defense budget as a whole remained relatively constant, owing to Italy’s economic
growth.20
Compared with the strategic ambitions of Italy (which was a founding member of both NATO and the Group of Seven), Spain’s aims were somewhat more
limited. In its official statements, the country often refers to itself as a “medium
power,” with its sphere of influence stretching from the western Mediterranean to
the waters of the Atlantic between the Iberian Peninsula and the Canary Islands.21
Even under the regime of General Francisco Franco, Spain received U.S. military
assistance (mostly in the form of second-rate ships) to provide sea control vis-àvis the Soviet navy.
Franco’s death in 1975 sparked a period of increased naval spending that laid
the foundation for today’s fleet. While Italy and France were adamant about
using their respective shipbuilding capabilities and maintaining their militaryindustrial prowess, Spain initially relied on American ship designs and combat
systems. By the early 1990s, the Armada Española had evolved into a small yet
modern multipurpose fleet, designed around a small STOVL aircraft carrier
(based on the U.S. vision of a sea-control ship), nineteen other large surface
combatants, and a flotilla of eight submarines.22
As did most other Western states, Spain experienced considerable economic
prosperity during the 1990s. At the same time, it reduced defense spending
steadily, to 1.2 percent of GDP by early in the first decade of the twenty-first
century. Although the booming economy could compensate for the shrinking
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol71/iss3/4
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defense apportionment, a number of large-scale shipbuilding programs were
coming on line, consuming large chunks of the navy’s budget. Amphibious forces
were at the top of the procurement list. As was the general trend among European defense planners, Spain’s considered expeditionary capabilities essential in
the post–Cold War security environment. In line with this paradigmatic shift
in the country’s naval strategy, two Galicia-class amphibious assault ships were
procured, together with a pair of tank landing ships and a replenishment oiler.23
The funding for five new escort vessels—the F-100 or Álvaro de Bazán class—
was granted in 1997. This air-defense frigate benefited from the fact that, unlike
some of its foreign counterparts, it incorporated the American-designed Aegis
combat system, based on the SPY-1D radar and the Standard Missile 2 (referred
to as the SM-2). Combining these powerful yet off-the-shelf capabilities with a
relatively attractive price tag would pay dividends nearly ten years later, when
Australia chose the Spanish design over the more capable but more expensive
American Arleigh Burke–class destroyer.24
Germany: From the Littorals to Blue Waters. Nominally the fifth-largest navy in
Europe, the German navy has pursued a somewhat different course over the past
decades. Over the centuries, Germany has remained a land power, only occasionally showing greater naval aspirations.25 Given the geographic as well as historic
realities (access merely to the Baltic and North Seas, and under constant suspicion of militarist tendencies from its own population), the country has found it
difficult to take a leading role in European defense and security matters. With
the dismantling of large parts of the former East German navy after German
reunification in 1989, the nation’s underlying strategic aims and needs had to be
revisited.
Throughout the Cold War, the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) Navy had
been tasked with defending West Germany’s shores from amphibious assault and
(together with the Danish navy) preventing Warsaw Pact forces from exiting the
Baltic Sea via the Danish straits. Hence, the FRG Navy was designed primarily
to conduct ASW and antisurface warfare (ASuW) in the confined and relatively
shallow waters of the Baltic Sea, with a secondary escort role along the SLOCs in
the North Sea and toward the English Channel.26 But by the end of the Cold War
the German navy already had begun transitioning from a brown-water force that
operated within its littorals to a blue-water fleet that was capable of sustained
deployments on the high seas.27
Like most of its NATO partners, Germany cut defense expenditures over the
following decade: the military budget shrank from U.S.$73 billion to $50 billion.
Meanwhile, the navy decommissioned large parts of its aging fleet. Unlike its
neighbors, the German navy refrained from acquiring any vessels specifically
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designed for amphibious operations (for both doctrinal and political reasons).
Rather, a number of new surface combatants—still largely influenced by Cold
War requirements—were accepted into service (the K-130 corvette and F-123
ASW frigate).
In the aftermath of the Cold War, Germany remained reluctant to deploy military force outside NATO’s primary area of interest. Notwithstanding the young
German state’s participation in so-called out-of-area operations in the Persian
Gulf (mine clearing, 1990–91) and the Adriatic (embargo against Serbia, 1992–
96), a Federal Constitutional Court ruling was necessary to decide whether such
deployments were in fact in accordance with German law.28 Still, irrespective of
legal questions, the navy’s activities throughout the following decades remained
limited to peacetime deployments as part of NATO’s standing naval groups and
focused on relatively small operations in low-threat environments.
The Netherlands and Denmark: The Defense Industry as a Deciding Factor. The
dramatic shift within the global security environment affected the remaining,
smaller European navies to varying degrees.
The Royal Netherlands Navy, for example, tried to adapt to the new situation
by promoting technological and operational defense cooperation with its European partners. Examples of this effort are the Belgian-Dutch Naval Cooperation (BENESAM); the U.K./Dutch amphibious force; the Dutch iteration of the
Galicia-class amphibious warfare ship (HNLMS Rotterdam, which joined the
fleet in 1997); and the class of air-defense frigates, based on a trilateral frigate
project among the Netherlands, Germany, and Spain.29 Similarly to the Royal
Navy, large parts of the Dutch escort fleet had become superfluous in the absence
of a traditional naval threat. At the same time, significant investments had become necessary to replace the increasingly obsolescent subsurface fleet.
The Dutch navy also can be commended for investing in local ship designs
and combat systems rather than acquiring foreign designs. A case can be made
that if all European navies at the time had opted, for political or financial reasons,
for American hardware (which in some cases was more advanced technologically,
more readily available, or both), many industrial capabilities and proficiencies
would have been lost outright. Clearly, the Netherlands was particularly keen on
remaining competitive in the international defense market, given its large investments and expertise in the field of naval defense systems. For example, the active
phased-array radars fitted on German, Dutch, and Danish frigates and the radars
on French, Italian, and British destroyers (designated SMART-L) all are produced
by the Dutch company Thales Nederland.
Also located in the North Sea, the Søværnet (Royal Danish Navy) provides a
useful example for how smaller navies have dealt with shrinking defense budgets and a widening scope of operational requirements. Faced with the difficult
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol71/iss3/4
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question of how best to deal with these two diverging trends, Danish shipbuilders came up with an ingenious solution: the Standard Flex (StanFlex) modular
mission-payload system. Warships no longer would have to be designed for one
specific task, but rather could swap standardized modules in and out, depending
on the mission requirement. Considerable costs could be saved simply by fitting
a platform with various guns and antiship and antiair missile-launching systems
when operating in a contested environment, then swapping them for mine-warfare
systems, sonars, or equipment for pollution control and hydrographic surveys
once the threat had passed. Owing to the growing obsolescence of the Danish
fleet, policy makers decided that the Danish navy, over time, would replace its
seventeen surface combatants with six vessels based on the StanFlex system.30
Significantly larger than previous frigates, the Royal Danish Navy’s Absalonclass command-and-support vessel (still in an early design stage during the late
1990s) reflected the navy’s slow doctrinal shift toward power-projection and
expeditionary capabilities. Like many of its European neighbors, Denmark increasingly focused on deploying naval power over greater distances, alongside
its NATO allies.
Opposing the General Trend: Navies and Territorial Defense
The majority of Europe’s naval forces underwent a strategic shift toward power
projection, stability operations, expeditionary capabilities, and out-of-area
deployments. But a handful of navies continued to adhere to the principles of
territorial defense, control of SLOCs close to home, and sea-denial capabilities
within the approaches to their shores.
The Nordic Countries. Finland, Sweden, and, to a somewhat lesser extent, Norway are examples of smaller European navies that placed a premium on defending their territories from invasion throughout the first decade of the post–Cold
War period.
Recognizing Scandinavia’s inherent geographic vulnerabilities (in particular, a
lack of strategic depth), political and military leaders alike stressed the fact that,
despite fundamental changes in the international security order, caution was
well-advised. “Europe is still resolving many areas of conflict [and] all nations do
indeed value military strength. . . . Therefore we cannot, within the foreseeable
future, neglect the risks of war and that Sweden could be subject to an armed
aggression,” Admiral Peter Nordbeck of Sweden reminded others.31 Therefore,
these navies’ principal functions were to deny the aggressor use of SLOCs, gain
sea control in territorial waters, and defend ports and naval bases.32
Aegean Rivals. For much of the past century, Turkish and Greek naval thinking has been based on similar principles. With their territories located on a political, cultural, and religious fault line, these two major antagonists have made
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significant investments in their military forces. Many of these investments have
been justified by the ostensible threat the two states pose to one another, despite
the fact that they are NATO allies. Consequently, Greece and Turkey spent more
than 3.5 percent of their GDPs on defense throughout the 1990s.
The bulk of both navies consisted of platforms capable of conducting sea
control / sea denial and protecting SLOCs. This included a sizable element of
surface combatants (either surplus U.S. ships or vessels of other foreign design),
as well as numerous fast-attack craft. Furthermore, both navies commanded a
powerful subsurface element, of German origin. While the Turkish fleet enjoyed
a numerical advantage over the Hellenic Navy throughout the Cold War, it also
faced the threat of a possible Soviet attack aimed at securing the exit to the Mediterranean via the Turkish Straits. Therefore, Turkey had to maintain a credible
mine-warfare capability not only to control the straits but also to act as a counterweight to the Soviet (later the Russian) Black Sea Fleet.33
Unlike many other European states, these two did not consider the ability to
project power over great distances to conduct peacekeeping missions and stability operations to be primary concerns. Although both Greece and Turkey participated in naval operations outside their principal spheres of interest alongside
their NATO allies, the basic tenets promulgated in both countries’ defense strategies remained unchanged.34 Throughout the last years of the twentieth century,
both navies were well financed and maintained a high level of readiness.
AFTER THE FALL OF THE TOWERS (2001–14)
Throughout the 1990s, many naval forces in Europe still were able to adapt readily to the evolving security environment. For the most part, a sufficient number
of trained personnel (many states retained conscription) and a sufficient amount
of matériel allowed the Europeans to address the various security challenges
with relative ease. Moreover, the overwhelming superiority of the U.S. armed
forces compensated for the shortcomings and capability gaps that slowly emerged
among European militaries. What is more, throughout the 1980s many navies
had undergone comprehensive modernization efforts, receiving state-of-the-art
aircraft, ships, and submarines. Therefore, most navies were in a good condition
to fulfill the missions of a so-called postmodern navy, which include sea control,
expeditionary operations, stability operations / humanitarian assistance, good
order at sea, and cooperative naval diplomacy.35
Land Wars and Economic Woes
The twenty-first century barely had begun when the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, sent shock waves rippling across the globe. Although sea
power played an important role during the opening phases of both the U.S.-led
invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 and that of Iraq two years later, the subsequent
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counterterrorism and counterinsurgency campaigns had long-lasting consequences for Europe’s sea services. As in previous military campaigns, American
carrier strike groups took station in the Indian Ocean, Persian Gulf, and Red Sea,
from where they conducted air strikes against enemy forces and provided air support for allied troops on the ground. Other elements of the U.S. Navy and Marine
Corps provided sea- and airlift capabilities and contributed elite ground forces to
the fight (Marines and USN SEALs).
Although some of the European navies (in particular the British and French)
participated effectively in these campaigns, the evolving struggle against globally networked radical jihadi
The . . . reemergence of great-power rivalry . . . , terrorism seemed to vindicate
the theory that traditional
one of the largest refugee crises since the end
of the Cold War . . . , terrorist attacks by radi- concepts of high-intensity
cal jihadists . . . , the U.S. rebalancing toward conflict and maneuver warthe Indo-Pacific region, and President Donald fare against peer competitors
largely had lost their releTrump’s “America First” policy have heightvance.36 Following the general
ened the sense of uncertainty.
trend toward peacekeeping
and stability operations in distant theaters, Europe’s armed forces progressively
calibrated their capabilities accordingly. However, the necessary financial resources were increasingly difficult to secure.
As the security situations in Afghanistan and Iraq deteriorated, many states
involved in the conflicts felt compelled to make greater investment in protecting
their troops on the ground and toward bringing the wars to a quick and satisfactory conclusion. However, simply increasing the defense budget to buttress national
military commitments was in many cases politically unfeasible. The money for
these contingencies had to come from either the existing defense budget or supplementary and emergency funding. With army and air force components receiving a
larger share of funding, many navies had to make do with even less money.
The global financial crisis of 2007, the subsequent eurozone crisis, and the
economic downturn that ensued combined into a perfect storm buffeting armed
forces across Europe. After the end of the Cold War, many states had been able to
consolidate their militaries, despite fiscal restrictions; but against the backdrop of
tanking economies, a failing financial sector, and soaring national debt, even the
previous levels of defense spending and the corresponding force structures were
considered unsustainable in many cases.
Doing More with Less: Austerity Measures and Growing Capability Gaps
The United Kingdom: Truncating a Fleet. The repercussions for Europe’s naval
forces were arguably most noticeable in the case of the Royal Navy. Early in the
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first decade of the twenty-first century—still a time of relative plenty—the RN
introduced two Albion-class assault landing ships and three Bay-class dock landing ships, bringing the number of large amphibious-warfare ships up to seven.
The Invincible-class carriers, although reduced to two ships in 2005, added a substantial power-projection capability and reinforced the concept of expeditionary
warfare outside NATO’s previous area of operations.37 At the same time, a class
of up to twelve new Type 45 air-defense destroyers was under construction and
the first unit of the highly capable Astute-class nuclear-powered attack submarine
was launched in 2007—just months before the economic crisis hit.
With that crisis taking full effect and the British government being pressed
to reduce its budget deficit, the military became subject to draconian austerity
measures. The Strategic Defence and Security Review, hastily published in 2010,
called for the RN’s Harrier naval air arm to be disbanded and the flagship, Ark
Royal, to be scrapped. The other ship of this class, Illustrious, was retained as a
temporary amphibious transport helicopter carrier until the amphibious assault
ship HMS Ocean was refitted.
The remaining legacy frigates were decommissioned, and because production
of Type 45 destroyers had been cut off after six units and numerous cost overruns,
the RN’s escort fleet shrank to only nineteen vessels. The replacement program
for Britain’s maritime patrol aircraft was terminated, leaving a significant capability gap to this day. Finally, only one of the two new Queen Elizabeth–class carriers
was to become operational; the second would be sold or held in reserve.38
It would not take long for these measures to take their toll on Britain’s ability
to shape events abroad. During the air campaign against the regime of Mu‘ammar
Gadhafi in the summer of 2011, French, Italian, and American fixed- and rotarywing combat aircraft were launched from carriers stationed off the coast of
Libya. Britain having axed its carrier capability, its Tornados and Typhoons had
to deploy from land bases in England and Italy. Smaller and less capable than at
any time in recent memory, the Royal Navy arguably had reached the nadir in
its history.
France: Willing but Stretched. Although the Marine Nationale was able to deploy
highly capable carrier-based combat aircraft against targets from Afghanistan
to Libya, the first decade of the twenty-first century proved to be anything but
smooth sailing for the French navy.
Already in the late 1970s the idea for the replacement of France’s existing
flattops was floated. Consequently, the keel of the MN’s first nuclear-powered
carrier, Charles de Gaulle, was laid down in 1989. However, the program ran into
major difficulties. Key components had severe design flaws, and a lack of funding
meant the ship became operational only after more than a decade of construction
and retrofitting. To this day, Europe’s most powerful conventional naval asset has
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol71/iss3/4
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FIGURE 1
UNITED KINGDOM DEFENSE SPENDING AND MAJOR VESSELS, 1990–2016
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been plagued with technical problems. Moreover, the absence of a comparable
asset among the other European navies left the ship in high demand, causing substantial wear and tear. In light of the technical hurdles and increasing financial
restrictions, a second carrier never was built. Moreover, although some progress
was made circa 2005–10, the joint venture between France and Britain to build a
class of carriers with similar layout did not materialize.39 Consequently, the MN’s
strike capabilities become substantially limited during the recurring maintenance
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cycles of Charles de Gaulle. At the time of this writing, the ship was undergoing
its midlife refit and upgrade and will not return to the fleet much before 2020.40
Over the years, military-to-military relations progressively matured between
France and NATO, notwithstanding the political fallout with the United States
over the invasion of Iraq. More importantly, in 2009 President Nicolas Sarkozy
put an end to the “French exemption” and the country officially rejoined NATO.
As a RAND study noted, “France today is much more integrated in NATO planning and operation than at any time since the mid-1960s.”41
In terms of naval capabilities, France’s expeditionary-driven foreign policy
during the 1990s resulted in the construction of three Mistral-class amphibious
assault ships / helicopter carriers, which not only act as a stopgap when the single
carrier is unavailable but have provided the MN with credible power-projection
capabilities since being introduced in the middle of the first decade of the new
century.
Meanwhile, on the basis of their experience on their joint Horizon project,
France and Italy set out to build a new multipurpose frigate, known as the
FREMM.42 Both navies intended the class to replace their existing conglomerations of older surface combatants; the French navy hoped to procure nineteen
units. Although the program can be considered a success story, France had to
limit its ambitions in the light of economic woes following the economic crisis.
Ultimately the MN will receive only eight FREMMs, bringing the escort fleet
down to fifteen vessels, five of which (of the La Fayette class) already were not
intended to be principal surface combatants at the time of their commissioning
in the 1990s.43
Italy: Within a Basin of Turmoil. The Italian navy has remained a powerful tool
for Italian foreign policy throughout the twenty-first century. In fact, the country’s strategic goals have remained largely unchanged since their articulation in
the late 1970s. In accordance with Italy’s strategic interests, the navy continued to
enhance its expeditionary capabilities (the goal was to be able to deploy a brigadelevel force); strengthen its naval airpower; acquire multirole platforms to counter
all forms of threat; and promote national defense, maritime awareness, and maritime security.44
Throughout the last decade, the Marina Militare has maintained a very high
operational tempo and has conducted a plethora of naval tasks. In doing so it has
relied on a capable and well-balanced fleet and highly trained crews. The domestically built aircraft carrier Cavour was brought into service in 2008, and will be
capable of deploying the Lockheed Martin F-35B STOVL fighter in the future.
Its predecessor, Giuseppe Garibaldi, meanwhile functions as a helicopter carrier.
The demand for an Italian carrier air wing results from the shrinkage of the U.S.
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Navy’s footprint in the Mediterranean over the last two decades. “[It] seems to
be a reasonable assumption [that] the Cavour and the Italian fleet are effectively
going to be a substitute [for the] American carrier battle group in the larger Mediterranean as the reduced US Navy carrier line-up is increasingly concentrated on
the Pacific and Indian Oceans.”45
The escort fleet comprises two destroyers of the Horizon, or Andrea Doria,
class, and a growing number of new FREMM frigates. In contrast to France’s
curtailment policies, the Italian Ministry of Defense has decided to procure all
ten frigates it initially planned. Italy’s submarine fleet has profited from close cooperation with Germany’s ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems and has received four
Type 212A submarines with
[W]hile most navies have excelled at conduct- air-independent propulsion.46
Most importantly, both
ing operations at the lower end of the intensity
Italy’s navy and its coast
spectrum and within largely permissive enviguard have been burdened
ronments, traditional war-fighting capabiliheavily with operations on
ties . . . against near-peer competitors have
atrophied severely in the quarter-century since the lower end of the intensity
the end of the Cold War. The shortage of plat- scale. Apart from everyday
duties, such as making port
forms, as well as the lack of mission-specific
calls, conducting search-andtraining and exercises, . . . finds its origin in
rescue operations, and mainstrategic shortsightedness, political myopia,
taining good order at sea, adand the attendant fiscal austerity measures.
ditional challenges for Italy’s
sea services have resulted from political developments along Europe’s southern
and eastern shores over the past decade. Faced with thousands of refugees trying
to escape poverty and war throughout Africa and the greater Middle East, both
services have been engaged actively in countering human trafficking, as well as
delivering humanitarian assistance across vast areas of the Mediterranean basin.
Accordingly, the MM also has maintained a large contingent of offshore patrol
vessels that are better suited for constabulary duties than their heavily armed sisters. As one observer notes, “[t]he Marina Militare’s activities in this regard make
it stand out in terms of its compliance with the duties imposed by treaty—and by
humanity—in respect of the safeguarding of lives at sea.”47
In combination with Italy’s numerous other military commitments, these
developments have left a smaller number of platforms dealing with a greater
number of tasks. With dwindling resources and fewer platforms, the MM hardly
can maintain its tempo of deployment across a host of areas without risking fatigue and accident. Perhaps even more importantly, since transitioning to an allvolunteer force, personnel costs have placed a substantial burden on the defense
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budget, thereby limiting funding for maintenance and procurement.48 Italian
naval leaders remain adamant that the MM will be able to “fulfill its national and
international commitments.”49 But despite these protestations, the country may
have to limit its ambitions: “For the navy, the longer-term consequence will likely
be some re-orientation towards regional intervention capabilities at the expense
of its current enthusiasm for extra-regional expeditionary deployments.”50
Spain: Creating a Balanced Fleet. Over the years, most European navies have
streamlined their respective naval command structures while trying to modernize their fleets. As new and more-capable platforms were introduced over time,
older systems were phased out. Given the complexity and cost of many of these
platforms, ships and aircraft rarely were replaced on a one-for-one basis. Rather,
since the turn of the century, European naval forces have experienced what is
arguably the most drastic decline of platforms in recent history.51 The eurozone
crisis only exacerbated the strained situation in which many armed forces found
themselves, which was particularly pronounced in states with relatively weak
economies.
Spain’s economy, for example, was affected gravely by the crisis, and hence its
armed forces were as well. Consequently, the Spanish navy has faced severe financial pressure in recent years. Fortunately, the core of its current fleet was procured prior to Spain’s financial woes. This includes the 28,000-ton Juan Carlos, a
“strategic projection ship”; a class of five Álvaro de Bazán Aegis frigates; and the
Cantabria replenishment tanker. These projects also have had a positive effect on
Spain’s domestic shipbuilding industry, which is building for foreign customers
both the aforementioned frigates and the assault ship. However, while Navantia
has made a name for itself as one of the leading shipbuilders of surface vessels on
the continent, it did not cover itself in glory in providing Spain’s future underwater flotilla. Major technical difficulties led to cost overruns and the postponement
of the introduction of the new S-80 Isaac Peral class, resulting in bad publicity.52
While from a purely platform-centric view the navy’s situation might have
seemed quite satisfactory, the lack of funding had a negative impact on training
and readiness. The number of military personnel continued to decline throughout the first decade of the twenty-first century, adding to the shortage of trained
officers and sailors. “[O]ne of the ways the Spanish . . . ensured continuity of
capabilities in the face of spending constraints has been to reduce overall training levels,” a study points out.53 “Manning problems have hurt the Spanish Navy’s
ability to deploy multiple units at a short notice,” the study adds.54
Overall, Spain is likely to find it increasingly painful to support its wide range
of capabilities at current spending levels. It therefore remains to be seen whether
the navy will be able to retain the well-balanced fleet it currently operates.
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Capabilities Lost—Some for Good
Other states that also had shifted toward more-comprehensive expeditionary
capabilities during the 1990s, such as the Netherlands and Denmark, largely
accepted the loss of specific naval capabilities while retaining smaller, still proficiently skilled forces.55
The Netherlands. The Dutch, for example, went from having one of the largest
and most capable Cold War fleets to what some observers believe to be a secondrate navy, arguably too small to deal effectively with tasks across a wide portion
of the intensity spectrum at the same time.56
Although in 2000, Dutch defense white papers had outlined the various functions of the Royal Netherlands Navy, such as deploying a brigade-size element
into high-intensity operations, one can concur with the assessment that by the
end of the decade the “Dutch military [had] fallen well short of the 2000 white
paper’s goals.” This comes as no surprise, given that over the course of ten years
seventeen surface combatants were decommissioned, replaced by only four De
Zeven Provinciën–class frigates. In contrast to these highly capable air-defense
frigates, the four Holland-class large oceangoing patrol vessels that also were
added to the fleet are designed with low-intensity operations in Dutch overseas
territories specifically in mind. Despite their sophisticated sensor suite, they lack
hitting power for force-on-force engagements. Moreover, by 2005 the remaining
Dutch P-3C Orion maritime patrol planes were sold to Germany, leaving a void
in the country’s maritime awareness capability.57
On a more positive note, the navy’s amphibious forces have benefited from the
commissioning of two Rotterdam-class LPDs and the 28,000-ton joint support
ship Karel Doorman over the last decade, and the submarines of the country’s
small flotilla have demonstrated their proficiencies, both during exercises with
NATO allies and while recently shadowing a Russian carrier group as it deployed
to the Mediterranean.58
Denmark. Denmark was able to secure funding for two Absalon-class flexible
support ships and three Iver Huitfeldt–class multipurpose frigates. Danish military activities over the last decade ranged from deployments to Afghanistan and
contributions to antipiracy operations, such as the European Union’s Operation
ATALANTA and NATO’s Operation OCEAN SHIELD, to providing naval elements
to NATO’s standing maritime groups and participating recently in NATO’s ballistic missile–defense effort.
However, Denmark’s newly won blue-water capabilities came at the expense of
more-traditional elements of sea power; most prominently, all four of the navy’s
submarines were phased out by 2004, leaving it without one of the most useful
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FIGURE 2
GERMAN SUBMARINE PROCUREMENT, 1960–2040
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naval assets.59 “Today the fleet has no submarines, no fast attack craft and no
dedicated minelayers.”60
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Germany. Unsurprisingly, Germany, given its status as a world leader in conventional submarine technology, retained its submarine force throughout the post–
Cold War period. Notwithstanding the addition of state-of-the-art platforms, the
size of the German navy shrank in lockstep with the reductions to the defense
budget. As an example, while twenty-three submarines were in service in 1990,
the number had fallen to fourteen by 2000. Another fifteen years later, only six
vessels were left. The surface fleet received capable F-124 Sachsen-class guidedmissile frigates, which could provide fleet air defense for anything up to carrier
strike groups; a new class of so-called stabilization frigates also was procured. Despite being larger in size, these F-125 stabilization frigates are less heavily armed
than their predecessors. Therefore, a new crewing concept and modular design
are intended to allow for longer periods of deployment over greater distances.
These ships—as well as the next class of very large surface combatants, the MKS180s—are the navy’s answer to the requirements postulated in the defense white
paper of 2006.61 The recent decommissioning of its last patrol boats (guidedmissile craft) largely concluded the shift from a brown-water force to a blue-water
navy. However, growing concerns over Russia’s military activities in the Baltic Sea
have called this transition into question, and Germany again is looking to expand
its naval capabilities in littoral waters closer to home.62
Over the last decades, Germany also has remained relatively reluctant to commit greater resources to Europe’s common defense. Except for its contribution
to the security mission in Afghanistan, Germany often has been unwilling to
provide any form of hard power to recent NATO- or U.S.-led military operations,
such as in Libya and Syria. Rather, its involvement abroad has been focused on
peacekeeping missions and stability operations (such as with the United Nations
Interim Force in Lebanon [known as UNIFIL] from 2006 to the present) and deployments as part of NATO’s standing maritime groups, as well as providing good
order at sea more generally.63 With fewer vessels; the absence of large, amphibiouscapable platforms; and the above-mentioned political caveats, “[Germany’s]
cruising navy provides little in the way of power projection,” as one analyst has
noted.64 Much less can it claim to command sufficient and readily available antisurface and antisubmarine capabilities for high-threat environments. News of
the entire German submarine fleet recently being out of action simultaneously
is a case in point.65
Smart Solutions in the High North
Norway. Farther north, Norway gained public attention for making some clever
choices when it came to modernizing its naval forces. Although the defense budget plummeted from 3 percent of GDP in the early 1990s to 1.4 percent in 2014,
the Royal Norwegian Navy has kept its force at a high level of readiness.
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As its Cold War–era frigates reached the end of their service lives, a class of
larger and more capable surface combatants, based on the Spanish frigate design,
took shape. The first ship and namesake of the class, Fridtjof Nansen, was introduced into the navy in 2006. It is particularly well suited to perform a range of
missions in Arctic conditions along Norway’s SLOCs. Noticeably, the frigate is
the smallest warship to feature the Aegis combat system, while it can deploy the
new NH-90 helicopter for ASW operations. Closer to shore, Norway relies on
its Skjold class of stealthy, high-speed corvettes to counter symmetric and asymmetric threats from the sea.
Sweden. Sweden showed similar technical ingenuity in commissioning five corvettes of its own, of the Visby class, showcasing effective signature-reduction
measures. Both Norway and Sweden disbanded their network of coastal-defense
capacities during the first decade of the twenty-first century as the two countries
continued to forge close ties with their Western partners; however, Sweden reactivated its land-based, mobile, antiship missile systems in 2016.66
While territorial defense was not forgotten, participation within the framework of multilateral peacekeeping operations under the aegis of NATO and the
UN was promoted. “Our security cannot be maintained through a one-sided focus on the conventional defense of Norwegian territory,” Norway’s defense white
paper of 2004 stated.67 The close defense cooperation among the Scandinavian
states (such as Northern Defense Cooperation [known as NORDEFCO] and
Swedish‑Finnish naval cooperation), as well as with other NATO members, not
only has strengthened European and transatlantic ties; it has enhanced interoperability and proficiencies among the respective navies.68
Divergences along the Southern Flank
Greece. Arguably, the Hellenic Navy has seen the fewest doctrinal changes over
the past two decades. Even during a period when the majority of Europe’s armed
forces sought more-comprehensive expeditionary capabilities, the Hellenic Navy
remained focused on defending its adjacent waters and fulfilling its NATO obligations. The relatively constant strategic framework in which the navy operated
allowed it to strengthen its traditional naval elements (e.g., ASW and ASuW).
Despite the defense budget spiking at 3.3 percent of GDP in 2010, Greece’s financial collapse during the eurozone crisis had far-reaching consequences for the
country’s military. Coinciding with an important period of naval modernization,
it caused “existing domestic construction . . . to be paralyzed whilst longstanding
plans of new orders [were] stalled.”69 Although more recently there have been
signs of improvement, the Hellenic Navy quite likely will be facing some difficult
choices in the future. This is compounded by the fact that the balance of naval
power in the region already has shifted, and continues to shift, toward its traditional regional competitor, Turkey.
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol71/iss3/4

NWC_Summer2018Review.indb 32

20

5/1/18 11:10 AM

Stöhs: Into the Abyss?: European Naval Power in the Post–Cold War Era

STÖHS

33

Turkey. Turkey has been able to create a powerful navy that continues to expand
its capabilities—an exception among European naval forces. More importantly,
it has built a domestic defense industry proficient in developing and fielding everything from main battle tanks and unmanned aerial vehicles to patrol craft and
frigates.70
As the country tries to establish itself as a regional power, it also seeks to deploy its military effectively beyond its borders. Its naval forces act as an important
tool for gaining greater influence in the region. In the recent past, Turkish naval
forces have shown an increasing level of ambition in contributing to international
operations both within and beyond the Mediterranean (e.g., Turkish ships have
acted as the flagship of the counterpiracy Combined Task Force 151). Yet, in light
of the country’s recent coup d’état attempt and the subsequent purge within Turkey’s military, the navy, while a highly capable mix of foreign and domestic naval
platforms, probably will not reach its full potential.
The Turkish navy provides an insightful example of how domestic turmoil can
hamstring an expanding naval force. Since the turn of the century, the Turkish
ministry of defense has set out on an ambitious procurement plan for the navy.
This includes a number of highly sophisticated systems, ranging from domestically built Milgem- and Ada-class surface combatants to an amphibious assault ship
based on the Spanish carrier Juan Carlos. Because of the complexity of modern
warships, submarines, and aircraft, learning to operate them often involves very
steep learning curves. Therefore, such systems require highly professional crews
and astute commanders, as well as skilled engineers and other engineering personnel. Low morale, as well as widespread insecurities and suspicions within the
armed forces, will leave some considerable doubt regarding Turkey’s more assertive naval goals, such as the development of a carrier-based fixed-wing capability.71
AFTER THE FALL OF CRIMEA (2014 ONWARD)
In 2015, for the first time in more than two decades, Europe as a whole increased
its defense spending.72 This reversal of trends can be attributed directly to a
range of security-related concerns with which the European states see themselves
confronted.
The most worrying is the reemergence of great-power rivalry. After a “honeymoon period” of more than twenty years, Russia’s military intervention in
eastern Ukraine and the annexation of Crimea have reminded Europe that it
cannot take its security for granted. What is more, Russia’s irredentism and its
increasingly assertive behavior along Europe’s northern, eastern, and southern
borders coincided with one of the largest refugee crises since the end of the Cold
War. Meanwhile, terrorist attacks by radical jihadists across the continent have
caused a growing sense of insecurity within Europe. As if these challenges were
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not daunting enough, the U.S. rebalancing toward the Indo-Pacific region and
President Donald Trump’s “America First” policy have heightened the sense of
uncertainty.
Growing Pains
Against this backdrop of intersecting security challenges, European countries’
respective military strategies and defense postures (both national and NATO)
are being revisited. It appears that, for the first time since the end of the Cold
War, governments across Europe no longer can afford to reduce their own
defense spending while readily investing large sums of money in their welfare
states, all the while remaining utterly dependent on U.S. security guarantees.
Consequently, all twenty-nine NATO member states have pledged to increase
their financial contributions toward common security and defense.73 Meanwhile,
neutral Sweden and Finland also have made concerted efforts to forge closer ties
with their Western partners and strengthen their armed forces, not least in the
maritime domain.74
Financial considerations notwithstanding, new concepts for closer cooperation between Europe’s armed forces have been developed. Establishing bi- and
trilateral defense agreements has proved expedient in compensating for and
bridging the capability gaps created by years of austerity measures. The 2010
defense agreement between the United Kingdom and France (the “Lancaster
House treaties”) “provide[s] a road-map to more effective European defence
cooperation, based on deeper capability planning and mutual dependency.”75
For example, after more than half a decade of preparation, the Anglo-French
Combined Joint Expeditionary Force (a multiservice, scalable, power-projection
force capable of high-intensity warfare) became operational in April 2016, and
the force arguably has “set a new ‘gold standard’ for defence cooperation [in
Europe].”76 The German-Dutch Integrated Sea Battalion and the Spanish-Italian
Amphibious Battlegroup mandated by the European Union are further examples
of the efforts currently under way.77 It is safe to state that much of the cooperation over the past decades has enhanced operational experience among European
naval forces, and many naval officers have gained proficiencies in a broader range
of naval operations than their Cold War predecessors.
However, there are caveats that merit close attention. First, while most navies
have excelled at conducting operations at the lower end of the intensity spectrum
and within largely permissive environments, traditional war-fighting capabilities
(e.g., ASW and ASuW) against near-peer competitors have atrophied severely
in the quarter century since the end of the Cold War. The shortage of platforms,
as well as the lack of mission-specific training and exercises, is the chief cause of
this dangerous development, which finds its origin in strategic shortsightedness,
political myopia, and the attendant fiscal austerity measures. In many instances,
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navies find themselves unable to provide sufficient means to conduct their daily
tasks, as “demonstrated by the ‘gapping’ of certain standing commitments to
allow warships to be released for increasingly important NATO taskings.” Consequently, oceangoing patrol vessels and auxiliaries fulfill missions traditionally
conducted by potent frigates and destroyers.78
Second, at the end of the Cold War, European powers were able to field, deploy, and sustain division-size units in operations such as DESERT STORM. In
contrast, today such an effort would be largely futile.79 Although they constitute
the most-credible amphibious forces in Europe, French and British troops are
“unlikely to be deployed in
a high-threat environment
[D]efense cooperation among the European
without
considerable U.S.
partners will need to encompass new common
force protection.”80 The milistrategic guidelines, shared operational and
doctrinal procedures, better training for mili- taries have been “hollowed
tary personnel, and a much-improved mainte- out to such an extent that the
deployment of a brigade, let
nance and readiness level of naval platforms,
as well as greater industrial and technological alone a division, at credible
readiness would be a major
collaboration.
challenge.” 81 Ultimately, the
European states barely manage to conduct basic peacetime (naval) duties at the
desired rate, and have little to no surge capacity for emergencies.
Striking a Balance
For the above-mentioned reasons, each state must strike a balance between deploying low-end military capabilities for daily tasks, on the one hand, and highend war-fighting capabilities for worst-case scenarios, on the other. With regard
to naval power, the question remains to what extent “navies [should] invest their
resources in high-intensity capabilities aimed at deterring or, if necessary, prosecuting conflict with other navies, rather than in low-intensity capabilities best
suited to the maintenance of good order at sea.”82
Arguably, the soundest solution to this problem is for European governments
once again to provide sufficient funding for the naval branches to maintain
relatively well-balanced fleets and operate them in a joint and combined fashion
(i.e., with land, air, and other sea forces). These fleets need to be designed, first
and foremost, to fight in contested environments, but, at the same time, must be
configured to conduct many years of peacetime duties. If designed with sufficient
room to grow, such naval forces would remain flexible enough to react to the
ever-evolving security environment. Multipurpose surface combatants (ranging
from two to seven thousand tons in displacement), amphibious-capable assets
with substantial redundancies, small flotillas of modern submarines, and airborne maritime-surveillance platforms, in combination with the vital associated
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replenishment and sealift capabilities, are best suited to adapt to and conduct the
various missions expected in the future. At the same time, defense cooperation
among the European partners will need to encompass new common strategic
guidelines, shared operational and doctrinal procedures, better training for military personnel, and a much-improved maintenance and readiness level of naval
platforms, as well as greater industrial and technological collaboration.
To list the multitude of measures European states are undertaking currently
to strengthen their militaries is beyond the scope of this article. However, it is
apparent that many have put a tentative end to the truncation of naval power and
are reinvesting in capabilities at the upper end of the intensity spectrum. Norway, Poland, the Netherlands, and Germany all are modernizing or enhancing
their underwater forces. Great Britain and Greece have decided to revive their
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities by reactivating and
procuring maritime patrol aircraft. Italy and France will receive new, capable
surface combatants over the coming years. The British government has recommitted itself to operating two carriers, the first of which should be in service by
2020—probably, initially, with a combined U.K./U.S. F-35B air group. And over
the next decade, Spain, Italy, and Turkey also probably will acquire this aircraft
for their flattops.
If this trend continues over the coming years and the ties within the transatlantic community remain robust, there is a good chance that Europe’s naval forces
will be better prepared and better equipped to perform the duties and fulfill the
many functions with which they are charged. They will have arisen from the abyss.
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